Volume 55

Issue 6

Article 3

2010

Through Papers to Persons
John T. Noonan Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
John T. Noonan Jr., Through Papers to Persons, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 1121 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss6/3

This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Noonan: Through Papers to Persons

2010]
THROUGH PAPERS TO PERSONS
JOHN

T.

NOONAN, JR.*

jargon and
the freedom from clich6 and
the freshness,
HE candor, citation
of impressive but irrelevant authority-these disunnecessary
tinctions mark Joe Vining's work and invite emulation. Vining confronts
the law as he has experienced it. The best of teachers, he teaches by example. His example is before me as I reflect on my experience as an appellate judge reading, interpreting, applying the law.
In his nomination hearings Robert Bork famously declared that he
looked forward to "an intellectual feast." Vining would not, I think, despite his own very strong intellectual interests, use Bork's metaphor to describe what ajustice or ajudge must partake of. Vining is not centered on
the solutions to intellectual conundrums. His hunger is for the real.

T

I.

PAPER

To paraphrase the old song, "It's Only A Paper Moon":
It's only a paper pile
Spilling over the chamber's desks.
Thousands of individual sheets of itFour hundred to four thousand pages of what are unblushingly identified as "excerpts of record," compilations of what was
said or happened in the entity from which appeal has been
taken; compilations meant to contain the essential but unconfined by any measure and often filled with the extraneous.
Three printed briefs, limited by rule to a total of about 100
pages of argument, multiplied by 20 or 30 depending on the
number of cases on the monthly calendar.
Petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc, 10 to 20
pages apiece, times say, 10, all pointing to great and gross mistakes in the opinions that the judge has authored or approved.
Opinions, memoranda dispositions, dissents, and drafts, all
of them putative judicial acts, totaling from 100 to 200 pages
floating in the chambers at one time and calling for response.
Correspondence from the A.O., the Administrative Office of
the federal courts; letters from the committee supervising the
judges' financial reports; admonitions, bulletins, updates from
the chief judge or administrative units of the circuit.
*

@ The Honorable

John T.

Noonan 2010.
(1121)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 6 [2010], Art. 3

1122

VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 55: p. 1121

Memoranda on current cases from law clerks and externs,
one's own and those of otherjudges on the current panel-say 6
memos at 25 pages apiece.
And when one turns from the immediate paper pile, there is
all the paper within the covers supplying the structure of the law:
201 volumes of federal statutes, annotated, occupying 19 feet
of shelf space with a total of 134,723 pages.
574 volumes of F.3d, the reports of federal appellate cases
beginning in 1993, plus some remaining volumes of F.2d, each
reporter containing about 1,400 pages.
Over 500 volumes of United States Reports, setting out the
opinions of the United States Supreme Court, the early volumes
as slim as 450 pages, the recent ones fat with 1,314 pages; a total
of 545 volumes, at an average of 1,100 pages.
I will not enumerate all that is in a library two floors away but there
lurk the learned treatises; the insightful law reviews assaying the law with
academic impartiality and student energy; and, as it might seem, the final
word, that of the Restatements issued by the American Law Institute. Each
of such "sources" of law is indispensable, depending on the case, to the art
of identifying relevant precedent or making a needed advance.
All these pieces of paper and not a human person on any page! But
wait. These pages are not created by machinery. A human being composed each paper.
The conventions of judicial writing favor the artificial or, if you like,
the make-believe, suppressing the persons in action. First, "the plaintiff"
and "the defendant" or, even more abstractly, "the appellant" and "the
appellee" replace the names of the actual parties, turning them from
human figures into legal figments. Second, the arguments made by their
lawyers are described by the opinion-writing judge as made by these figments. The most abstruse constitutional contention will be attributed to
the most untutored of litigants. Third, the judges do not acknowledge
that they have had aid in writing an opinion. Scientific articles are attributed to teams of investigators. Not so with judges' work. They rarely
credit a brief with an insight. They never say that the draft of the opinion
was by a law clerk. The judge has done it all or, in some cases, signaled by
the signature "per curiam," the court has done it all.
The real litigants are given legal labels. The real lawyers speak as if
they were the litigants. The court speaks as though an impersonal body
announced the laws. These ways are survivals from past practice. I doubt
that any are essential. I am sure that reformation of them would be resisted. By these ways the persons in the process disappear or are obscured.
Vining has been a pioneer in looking for the persons beyond the makebelieve.
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The writer of the bench memo or the draft of a memdispo coming
from one of my own law clerks or externs is a person I know. The writer of
an opinion or memdispo coming from another chambers of our court is,
in form, a judge, who undoubtedly has approved it but who may not have
actually written it. When I read the opinions of other courts I am even
more in doubt as to the author-the judge, the judge's law clerk or clerks,
or a combination of the judge and his clerks? Does the judge's name on
the opinion sufficiently decide this question?
When I turn to the statutes that govern the case, I confront the work
of some collectivity-the committees which approved the legislation, the
joint committee that composed the differences between the House and
Senate drafts, the Congress itself which adopted and amended what it got
from the joint committee. What persons speak in the final text?
In some cases, there is the Constitution itself to be attended to-a
comparatively slim document of 7 articles and 27 amendments, but annotated by over 9,500 opinions of the Supreme Court, to name only its most
authoritative annotator. The constitutional texts emerge from committee
choices or compromises, some of them made more than two centuries ago
in a fledgling country. The annotations come from different Supreme
Courts, sometimes contradicting each other. In 1932, Justice Brandeis observed after citing the multitude of cases in which the Supreme Court,
explicitly or implicitly, had overruled or abandoned its own earlier interpretations of the Constitution:
The court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so
fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial
functions.'
When the Constitution, glossed and re-glossed, speaks, whose voice is
heard?
Joe Vining has advised us to look at the ontology-that is, the real-in
the law. Persons are there. Persons with purposes are there. Rational
human beings are there, engaged in rational communications with other
human beings. The persons embody and embrace values to be preserved
and promoted. Can we find the persons, the purposes, the values in the
mass of verbiage unrolled on paper?
II.

PROCESS

Another reality is also present wherever there is law-the community
organized as government, empowering particular persons to act for the
community and to regulate the lives of persons within it. The person in
origin and in end transcends the community. The person as he or she
1. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis,

J., dissenting).
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exists is one part of the community. The problem of relating power to
love is the problem of relating the community to the person.
The place of precedent in the law illustrates the problem. Every case
is different. But many cases are so similar that they can be classed as falling under the same precedent. Otherwise, the legal system would not
work. Our circuit decides over 5,000 cases a year. If each case were truly
different, we would need 5,000 opinions to decide them. We actually issue
about 850 opinions annually. Precedent, applied, decides the rest.
In a pointed review of the jurisprudence of Richard Posner, David
Levi, speaking from his experience as a district judge, observed that it was
remarkable how Posner disdained the "average" case.2 Average cases, runof-the-mill cases, routine cases-these make up most of every court's
calendar.
The ordinary work of the law, Levi observed, is done by precedent.
Precedent requires classification. The person speaking in the precedent is
submerged. An old saw about the two Hands ran, "Quote Learned, but
follow Gus." What did the saying mean except that precedent spoke more
forcefully than the voice of the best of the Second Circuit?
The memdispo, as I call it, addresses the average case. It decides a
case whose governing rule is indisputable and the facts to which the rule
applies are clear. Occasionally, the memdispo is used by a panel to smuggle in a controversial decision so that it won't attract review and reversal.
Even more occasionally, the Supreme Court pounces on such a rogue
memdispo and does reverse it. By and large the memdispo serves the useful purpose of informing the parties that the court has read their briefs
and identified the rule governing their case. Memdispos are normally
written by law clerks. They do not appear in the federal reports. Persons
are affected by them but are subordinated to the process.
When precedent is so palpably controlling, could one devise a slotmachine that would decide the outcome if a clerk selected and fed in the
facts? I once knew a judge who was called "Automatic Al," or something
like it, on account of his rapid, predictable, precedent-driven responses.
Could we install a machine-made Automatic Al to dispose of the routine?
It might be occasionally mistaken. But so is everyjudge. Probable correctness is the best we achieve. Against the introduction of Automatic Al, I
hear the voice of Vining.
Precedent provides not personal voices but rules. So do all the writings of the collective bodies from Congress to the courts. We don't know
the individual draftsman. We know the collective conclusion. We know
that the text is addressed to persona. We read it as rational, purposeful,
value-laden human beings. Do we need to do more?

2. See David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DuKE L.J. 1791, 1801 (2009).
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Joe Vining has suggested that we do, at least that we should acknowl3
edge that "the real" in law depends on what is beyond the law. With
vigilant acumen, Vining has shown how different the legal order is from
the order of physics or even the order of biology. We cannot manage to
have a legal system by calculating forces and reactions nor can we have
one by assuming that our only distinction from other animals is our ability
to talk.
Suppose one does not share Vining's belief? Is the concept of a person with purposes and values make-believe? Are those treated as persons
really distinguishable from other natural forces or other active animals?
Many modern lawyers, law teachers, and judges abstain from asking such
questions that Vining's work pushes us to ask. Abstaining, these agnostics
do not confront head-on the question of how persons are subject to the
power of the community.
III.

POWER

What is meant by power in the legal context? It is not the physical
force of a steam engine. It is not water power or electrical power. Yet it
seems to have an impact and leave an imprint. No metric measures it, but
at times the impact is palpable, cutting through the paper morass, touching the flesh, the fortune, the home, the existence of the persons it
reaches.
Courts do issue mandates. But most of a judicial decision is not a
command, but an act of reasoning and persuading. Ajustice is not a general. The judges in the legal system are not soldiers.
"You have the power." The speaker was Byron White, an associate
justice of the United States Supreme Court. The addressees were a group
ofjudges recently appointed to the federal circuit courts. The implication
ofJustice White's remark was that the real power lay not with the Supreme
Court, able to handle a minuscule number of cases a year. The power is
with the circuits that decided fifty thousand or more. Like almost all participants in the power conferred by law, Justice White was convinced that
its exercise was mostly enjoyed by someone other than himself.
The Founders had the power to write the Constitution and the electorate had the power to accept it and amend it. Congress has the power to
make the laws. Once the constitution and the laws are in place, room for
further exercise of power is circumscribed. The president has the power
to pick the judges who will interpret and apply the law. In the criminal
area, the prosecutor has the power to decide who will be prosecuted, to
plea bargain, to request a sentence, to appeal a sentence. The lawyers in
any case have the power to bring a case, defend it, settle it, appeal it, to
make the myriad decisions that shape a case. Ajury in ajury case has the
power to believe the witnesses or not and within some limits to exhibit
3. See Joseph Vining, Law's Own Ontology-A Comment on Law's Quandary, 55
CATH.

U.L. REv. 695 (2006).
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severity or compassion. The trial judge has the power to make rulings on
the need for a trial, on admissibility of evidence, on the weight of the
evidence that will determine what kind of an appeal goes to the circuit.
Past precedents of the circuit set the boundaries for circuit action, as do
decisions of the Supreme Court. Any power that exists is limited, channeled, parceled out in small packets of paper.
Within the panel of three that will address the issues on appeal to my
court there is a further diminution of power. Each judge has one vote.
The presiding judge has the power of assigning the opinion but may lose
this power if the panel divides and he or she is the dissenter. The one who
writes the opinion must retain the vote of at least one member. The opinion is not the expression of a single mind.
The power of a circuit court judge, then, cannot be visualized as the
power of a man with a gun that can shoot at will, or the power of a dictator
able to declare what is the law. Power as material energy is applied by
multiple human interactions. The application is made through means
that depend for their operation on human language, memory, and reasoning. The power exercised by the judge will have physical consequences:
the transfer of money, the release or jailing or deportation of another
person, even an execution. But the exercise of power itself is by a communication. It is in the realm of words that analogies to it must be found or
distinguished. The judicial action culminates in an order affecting a particular person or persons, an order usually preceded by an explanation. It
is not a declaration of love that may be rejected by the addressee. It is not
a lecture that may be half-heard or forgotten. It is a set of instructions that
are to be followed by another judge or court officials or lawyers or litigants. The power exercised is not only in the conclusion of the instructions but in their framing.
The consequences of the exercise of power, partial and limited as it is,
may last a lifetime for those affected by it and longer than a lifetime if the
opinion, improbably, survives a generation or two. The exercise itself is
brief. For the case before the court, the exercise of power to decide it and
exhaustion of the power coincide.
For millions of persons the law is not more precise than the pile of
paper in the judge's chambers. They do not know the text of any statute,
the holding of any opinion, the exact wording of any provision in the Constitution. They are law-abiding persons. They know they must pay their
taxes and their debts, keep their contracts, drive carefully, and refrain
from injuring others. Imitation and habit sustain them in these practices.
They do not need a lawyer or a judge to tell them what to do to observe
the law.
These practices are not natural phenomena nor are they biological
interactions. They derive their existence from the current of power that
runs through law. They depend upon the belief-no make-believe-that
persons exercise that power.
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The place of power should not be exaggerated. Law can coerce. But
often it offers options. You can combine your assets with another and
make a contract. You can pool your assets with others and form a corporation to do business or bestow charity. You can bequeath your assets to
anyone. No law will compel you to adopt any of these options. The law
creates the opportunity. The law channels your choice, providing forms
for action.
The law also is constantly teaching-teaching not only in the imprecise and habitual ways that law enlists the law-abiding person, but teaching
precisely by procedural rules meant for professionals. What are most judicial opinions but pedagogy for lawyers and judges? A few lines conveys
whatever power is at work. Most of an opinion is reasoning directed at
minds.
The mass or mess of papers in the judge's chambers is not the law for
the case before the court in the precise sense of the words that will decide
that case. Those words have to be extracted from the papers surrounding
the judge, then set in order, made coherent and intelligibly related to the
case. A human mind, not a computer, will do the extracting, relating, and
making intelligible. In the ideal modern court, the mind will be that of
the writing judge, aided and prodded by the minds of colleagues and the
mind of a law clerk and by the challenging mind of a dissenter and by the
lawyers' minds disclosed by the lawyers in their briefs. The resulting opinion, if not overruled, will be the law of the case, the law of the circuit, the
law for now on this subject.
The process of producing this immediate, almost tangible law is not
bureaucratic. A bureaucrat is an official who knows the rules but does not
know that the purpose of the rules is to guide persons. The judge, as I
suppose the judge to be, is intensely aware that the judge's opinion will
affect the flesh or the fortune of other persons.
Still, the opinion is not the speech of a single person. It is not what
the judge would write if the judge were not acting for the community, not
what the judge would write solo without contribution of colleagues, clerks,
briefs, and "the sources of law."
What the judge writes is not what the judge would write if attending
only to the persons before the court. The opinion speaks to these persons
in the name of the community. The judge has in mind the persons before
the court. The judge has in mind the community. In the act ofjudgingthe act of applying the power of the community to the persons in the
case-the judge tries to do the best that can be done to take into account
both the persons before the court and the community. In that act power
is related to love.
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